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In the SupreDie C.ourt 
of the State of Utah 
LIQUOR COKTROL COMMISSION 
OF UT~\H, 
Plaintiff, 
NEW YORK: CASUALTY COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Intervenor, 
vs. 




ANSWER BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CHRIS E. ATHAS 
STATEMENT 
Before analyzing the complaint, and the theory of 
liability claimed to be alleged, we will refer to some gene-
ral inaccuracies in appellant's Statement of Facts. 
The statement (p. 3) that this appeal is "from an 
order of the District Court sustaining the defendant 
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Athas' motion to dismiss plaintiff's con1plaint," 1s not 
correct. The appeal is from an order dismissing the com-
plaint of plaintiff. 
On the motion of this respondent, to dismiss this 
appeal, it has been now settled that this order of dis-
missal will be construed and applied here as having dis-
missed the complaint of plaintiff for (1) "failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted," and (2) for 
refusal of appellant to furnish a more definite state-
ment, as provided by Civil Rule 12 (e) and as ordered 
by the Trial Court. This Court granted appellant's 
motion to amend its notice of appeal, so as to cover both 
matters. 
It is not quite correct, as intimated (p. 4), that this 
action was brought prior to the adoption of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This complaint was filed (R. 11-12) April 24, 1950. 
The said Civil Rules went into effect January 1, 1950, 
and therefore, had been in effect nearly four months. 
The fact is that appellant elected to adopt what has 
been referred to in the Federal Court practice as the 
"long" form of pleading, instead of what has been re-
ferred to as -the "short" form. The complaint, neither in 
substance nor in form, pleads a cause as permitted by 
Rule 8(a), nor is it in substance or form in accord with 
any of the suggested short forms under Rule 84. 
The complaint sets forth detailed facts upon which 
appellant relies and from which it seeks to have the Court 
deduce a theory of legal liability against this respondent. 
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"\Ve will accept the staten1ent by appellant (p. 4) 
that it 1uakes no additional claim on this appeal by reason 
of the second count of the cmnplaint, alleging a joint 
venture, and we agree that this count adds nothing. We 
\rill, therefore, n1ake no further reference to this second 
count. In other words, if the decision of the Trial Court 
is correct as to the first count of the complaint, we under-
stand that it ·will be considered correct as to the second 
count also. 
The statement of our position, and as to what we 
contended in the Trial Court (p. 5), is erroneous. We did 
not, and do not, contend that because 46-0-82 "provides 
* * * that a person contracting with the Liquor Control 
Commission of Utah to operate a package agency * . * * 
must be a 'natural person' * * * that, therefore, no other 
kind of 'person' could be held accountable to the Liquor 
Control Commission for conversion." 
We did claim, and will here claim, that this section 
has a bearing upon the meaning to be given the allega-
tions of the complaint, and upon the question of posses-
sion or control as an element of conversion; and also, 
particularly, upon the point as to whether it is alleged 
or can be clailned that the liquor handling involved was 
by anyone "acting in the ordinary course of the business 
of the partnership" (69-1-10), when it is also alleged that 
the partnership business was that of operating a "re-
tail pharmacy" and "drug store," which business is, by 
other statutes, registered, licensed and regulated as a 
different business entirely. (79-12-1 to 79-12a-14). 
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Another matter which it may be helpful to notice 
is the statement (p. 5) by appellant that the "same rule of 
procedure prevails under the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure as formerly, that is: that facts properly pleaded 
in the complaint must be taken as true under the motion 
to dismiss." 
We agree with this statement of the general rule, 
but this rule has limitations and qualifications, some of 
which appear to have application here. 
Bancroft's Code Pleading, VoL 1, Sec. 173, p. 296: 
"Sec. 173. LIMITATIONS OF RULE AS 
TO ADMISSIONS BY DEMURRER. - A 
demurrer admits only such facts as are issuable 
and well pleaded, it does not admit the truth of 
an allegation of a conclusion of law, mere deduc-
tions or opinions, or matters of law; allegations 
which are unnecessary or are contrary to the 
facts of which judicial notice is taken; * * * Nor 
is any inference of fact which is not presumed or 
which may not be reasonably or necessarily in-
ferred from the facts alleged, admitted." 
Additional cases in support of the foregoing are 
cited under the same section numbers in Bancroft's Code 
Pleading, Ten Year Supplement. 
State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987, is cited there 
by the author in support of the statements above quoted. 
The opinion contains this statement: 
"* * * and what is judicially known may not 
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The following California ca8es hold that allegations 
which are repugnant to what the Court judicially knows 
must be ignored. 
French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604,80 P. 1031, 69 L.R.A. 
556, ( 1905), i~ a leading case. rrhe Court, at p. 1033, 
states the rule as follows: 
""Those allegations of a pleading which are 
not necessary and which are contrary to the fact 
of which judicial notice is taken, are not admitted 
by a de1nurrer, but are to be treated as a nullity." 
House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dis-
trict, 144 P. 2d 389, (1944), cites and follows the French 
case. 
Sec. 104-25-1 U.C.A. (Session Laws 1951, p. 199), 
Provides: 
"Courts take judicial notice of the following 
facts: * * * 
''2. whatever is established by law; 
''3. public and private official acts of the 
legislative, executive, and judicial departments 
of this state and of the United States." 
This provision was formerly Sec. 104-46-1 U.C.A., of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
See, also, Warren v. Robinson, 21 Utah 429, 61 P. 
28, (1900), where the Supreme Court holds that it may 
take judicial notice of matters contained in its own re-
cords and file. 
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This case deals with the question as to what matters 
of general knowledge the court may, within its discre-
tion, judicially notice. The opinion says: 
"As stated in 15 R.C.L. pages 1057, 1058: 
'* * * courts should take notice of whatever is or 
ought to be generally known, within the limits of 
their jurisdiction, for justice does not require that 
courts profess to be more ignorant than the rest 
of mankind.'" 
The points of law, and the other and principal mat-
ters of difference, can best be presented under the re-
spondent's points which follow. 
It may clarify the general situation somewhat to 
state that, as to appellant's three points (p. 6), we do 
not dispute the general statement of law, as contained 
in Point I, but we do deny its application here, or that the 
facts alleged bring this respondent within the Rule 
stated. 
As to Point II, we admit that 46-0-82, among other 
things, is a restriction on the power of the Commission, 
but the balance of that point is directed to an issue which 
is in no way involved. The complaint affirmatively 
shows that appellant made Lack, and not the partnership, 
its "vendor," and that he continued to be such in the busi-
ness in which the loss occurred. 
We deny, and, under the last subdivision of our 
brief, will refute the conclusion stated as Point III. 
We directly challenge the claim of appellant's brief 
(p. 9) that it "has alleged conversion by the defendants 
of a portion" of liquor, "of the value of $37,805.17." 
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And, as we cannot be entirely sure that they clai1n 
this solely by reason of respondent\; partnership with 
Lack in the drug store, but may possibly clailn this by 
reason of the allegation as to conversion in Para. 7 (R. 
3), we v.ill deal with each of these separately. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
L 
The Trial Court did not err in sustaining the re-
spondent's motion to dismiss, and dismissing appellant's 
complaint on the ground that it did not state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
This, basically, is because: 
(a) The recital of conversion, in the complaint (R. 
3), is a conclusion of law, and it is not supported, but is 
nullified, by the specific facts alleged; and 
(b) The claim of conversion, based on the theory of 
the partnership relation of Lack with respondent in the 
pharmacy, is unsupported, and is unsound in law. 
II. 
The Trial Court did not err in granting respondent's 
motion for a more definite statement based on the ground 
that the complaint "is so vague and ambiguous" that re-
spondent "could not reasonably be required to frame a re-
sponsive pleading," nor in dismissing plaintiff's complaint 
for refusal to furnish a more definite statement when so 
ordered by the Court. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLAINT 
Allegations and Theory of liability pleaded: 
By three separate lines of allegation the complaint 
covers three things. These, briefly, are: 
1. The relationship existing by statute and con-
tract between the appellant, Liquor Commission, 
and the defendant, Lack, and the relation of both 
to the delivery and sale of liquor through the 
package agency business. 
2. The relationship between the respondent and 
C. V. Lack, as partners in the business of a "re-
tail pharmacy" and "drug store." 
3. Then, the separate and confusing paragraph 
7 (R. 3) which presumably attempts to allege 
some theory of partnership liability, and also 
vaguely suggests some breach of duty on the part 
of the individual defendants, Mr. Lack and Mr. 
Athas. 
1. Allegations as to Package Agency: 
These allegations are contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 
(R. 1) and 6, (R. 2), and in the contracts pleaded and 
incorporated. 
Para. 3 alleges the entering into the written agree-
ment by which Lack "was authorized to sell and distri-
bute liquor for the plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of 
the Liquor Control Act." 
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The agreement desig11ates Lack as the "vendor," 
as does the statute, and recites that he is also engaged 
in retail n1erchandising as a retail druggist. (R. 10) 
This is a recital of a necessary qualification because 
46-0-S:2, which authorizes these "package agencies" says, 
that appellant n1ay create such "by authorizing persons 
engaged in the business of conducting a retail merchan-
dising store to sell at such store in sealed packages liquor 
to be furnished by the Commission,***." 
The contract then recites respective covenants and 
agree1nents to be performed by the appellant and defend-
ant, Lack. The Comn1ission agrees to ''furnish liquor" 
for the purpose of the operation of the agency and Lack 
agrees to sell it at prices fixed by the Commission and 
account to it for the retail prices so fixed. It was agreed 
that: "The said package agency shall be carried on and 
conducted at the present place of business operated by 
the vendor at Brigham Street Pharmacy store located at 
East South Temple Street in Salt Lake City, Utah; and 
shall be designated as package agency No. 78." Lack 
was to receive from the Connnission "a minimum monthly 
salary * * * of $1,000.00, and such additional salary" as 
the Commission determined. 
In par. 4 (R. 1), it is alleged that by the agreement 
pleaded, Lack agreed to operate the agency "In that 
certain drug store * * * owned by the defendants as a 
partnership," etc. The "in" may be a little propaganda, 
as the contract, quoted above, says uat the Brigham 
Street Pharmacy store." The contract is controlling 
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as to what it says. And by statute ( 46-0-82) it had to be 
in a part of a retail store premises, designated and duly 
noticed by the Commission. 
Then, para. 6 (R. 2), alleges that between 1945 and 
1948 "pursuant to the terms of said agreement, plaintiff 
* * * delivered to the defe~dants at the Brigham Street 
Pharmacy liquor of the total value of $1,057,763.94 * * * 
and that the defendant (Lack) received and took posses-
sion of the same, pursuant to the terms and conditions 
of said agreement, Exhibit A." That is how all the liquor 
was handled and this includes the $37,800.00 worth not 
thereafter accounted for. 
The use of "defendants" in the first clause, and in 
this paragraph which is dealing with the contract be-
tween Lack and the appellant, appears likely to be a 
typographical error. It has no importance, anyway, in 
view of the last clause, that all the liquor was "received" 
by and taken into the "possession" of the defendant Lack, 
"pursuant" to the contract with him. Any inference of 
delivery into the possession of this respondent, or the 
partnership, is thus clearly negatived. Any delivery to 
the partnership would have been contrary to the contract, 
and, of course, a violation of the statute by the appellant 
itself, and will not be presumed. 
Liability against respondent IS not alleged or 
claimed by reason of his having or asserting possession 
of any liquor. The partnership is not a defendant, and 
so this term "defendants" cannot mean. or include it. 
10 
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So, too, there is no default by anyone clailned, until 
after Lack got possession of the liquor, and it was sold, 
and then the default is the failure "to account." (R. 3) 
'y e refer now to some of the Liquor Control stat-
utes, for two purposes. One is to aid in the interpreta-
tion of the contract and allegations, and the other is to 
show that the conduct of Lack indicated by the com-
plaint and atten1pted to be attributed to respondent con-
sists of not acts of sin1ple conversion, as to which one 
partner may bind another, so as to make him civilly 
liable; but would be acts in violation of statutes, which 
make them criminal acts, and for which another partner 
would not be generally chargeable. 
Sec. 46-0-50 places the responsibility for the distri-
bution and storage and for the delivery of alcoholic bev-
erages upon the Conunission, and under ( r) the govern-
ing of the "conduct, management, and equipment of any 
premises upon which alcoholic beverages may be sold 
* =I= * " 
And 46-0-82, supra, after providing, as above stated, 
that a liquor package agency must be in a retail store 
operated at the premises at which the agency is located, 
says: 
"The authorization shall be by certificate of 
the Commission, and such certificate shall desig-
nate the person in charge of such agency who 
shall be a 'vendor' under this act. The said person 
shall be a natural person and the exact location 
and description of the part of the premises 
where such liquor rnay be kept and sold shall be 
11 
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designated in the certificate, and liquor shall not 
be kept at any other place than as in the certifi-
cate designated." 
There is no allegation that any of this liquor was 
delivered, received, or kept in any part of the pharmacy 
premises other than that "part" designated for the liquor 
agency; and, too, it must be presumed that, when the 
defendant Lack "received and took possession of" the 
liquor in question, he did so in the "part of the premises" 
so legally designated. 
Under 46-0-244, the violation of any of the liquor 
statutes would have resulted in the forfeiture of the 
pharmacist and pharmacy licenses of the partnership; 
and under 46-0-237, the delivery to or keeping of the 
liquor here described in the partnership premises would 
have constituted these premises an abatable public 
nuisance; and under 46-0-197, and many other provisions 
of this statute (see: 46-0-107, 46-0-156, 46-0-157, 46-0-
157a), if Lack, while acting for this partnership, had 
done anything by way of handling this liquor, such would 
have constituted a crime. And, further, 46-0-58 expressly 
prohibits any person, authorized to sell liquor, to, by 
clerk or agent or otherwise·, "sell or furnish liquor in 
any other place * * * than as authorized by this act." 
Before leaving this first line of allegation, we point 
out that, not only is there no allegation that any of this 
liquor was kept or sold in "any other place" than that 
"designated" by the Commission, but there is no allega-
tion that this respondent was ever in this place, or ever 
l2 
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had anything to do 'vith the operation of it. If there 
could be clailned to be any such, appellant does not 
seen1 to rely upon thmn here. 
Its point (p. 6) is that respondent is liable, whether 
he •'knew of or participated* * *or not." 
Like\Yise, there is also no allegation that the part-
nership was engaged in the operation of this package 
agency business, or that it ever received possession of 
any of the liquor involved. Far from it, the partnership, 
as a distinctly separate line of business is alleged. And, 
particularly, there is no allegation that respondent was 
a member of any partnership which, "in the ordinary 
course of its business," could, or ever did handle this, 
or any, liquor, in any way. 
It is important, also, we think, to point out that Ex-
hibit "B," set up and incorporated in the complaint by 
plaintiff, recites that "it is mutually understood that 
there is an establishment on said premises used in the 
operation of a retail liquor store, and that the equipment 
used in its operation is not included or subject to this 
sales agreement." 
This is the agreement by which the partnership took 
over the pharmacy Dec. 13, 1945. (R. 10) And thus, the 
partnership did not contemplate the liquor business; 
and, also, it is plainly indicated that the, or at least a, 
package agency was operated in these premises prior 
to the commenceinent of the operation of the pharmacy 
by these defendants. 
13 
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In this connection, also, this document, Exhibit "B" 
(R. 10), also recites that the party who sold the phar-
macy to these defendants had, for. some time, operated 
this drug store business at that address. It may also be 
noted that, as to the portion of the premises designated 
for the liquor agency (R. 9), Lack agreed "to keep such 
premises open to the public for business purposes" on 
each day that the appellant permitted the sale of liquor. 
And it also recites, as indicated in the allegation above 
referred to, that the "said package agency shall be * * * 
conducted at the present place of business * * * at Brig-
ham Street Pharmacy store." 
Thus, it is indicated that the conditions as to the 
separate portions of the premises used respectively by 
the package agency and by the pharmacy were not 
changed by the formation of, or during the existence of, 
this partnership, nor were these distinctly separately 
owned and operated businesses changed. There is no 
allegation that they were, and the inferences which may 
be fairly drawn are that they were not. 
2. Allegation as to the Business of the Partners: 
Except for the mention in the allegations just re-
ferred to of the Brigham Street Pharmacy in par. 4 
(R. 2), and which are put there in explanation of the 
contract between the appellant and Lack, and of his right 
to so contract, because the package agency was to be in 
the "retail store" premises, the only other allegation as 
to the business of the partners is contained in par. 5. 
This paragraph alleges, in substance, that about Dec. 
14 
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13, 19-15, these two defendants entered into an agree-
ment with one Hedrick for the "purchase of the retail 
drug store" known as Brigham Street Pharmacy, and 
gives the location. 
Then (R. 2), "that at all tirnes herein mentioned, the 
said defendants owned and operated said Brigham Street 
Pharmacy as partners, and shared in the profits and 
losses thereof." That is all as to the nature or "the 
ordinary course of the business of the partnership" (60-
1-10). N"o connection, whatsoever, between this business 
and that of the foregoing package agency business is 
anywhere intended. 
Yet, this allegation seems to furnish the only basis 
for appellant's partnership theory, connecting respond-
ent Athas with the liquor business of appellant and de-
fendant Lack. It seems that from this relationship ap-
pellant argues that, what was done by Lack, the "ven-
dor," in receiving or selling liquor, and failing to remit 
the receipts therefrom, may be imputed to this partner-
ship in the drug store business. Or that the mere exist-
ence of a partnership in one business makes each partner 
therein liable for the defaults of the other in any other 
separate business undertaking of his. 
3. Allegations as to Breach of Duty: 
All of the allegations relating to breach of duty or 
upon which any liability may be claimed are contained in 
para. 7 (R. 3). 
15 
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This alleges that between December of 1945 and 
March of 1948, the defendarnts "sold and otherwise dis-
posed of liquor belonging to the plaintiff of the retail 
value of $37,805.17, for all of which the said defendants 
failed, neglected, and refused to account to this plain-
tiff, and that, therefore, the said defendants wrongfully 
converted the value thereof, to-wit: the sum of $37,805.-
17 to their own use, * * *" 
This paragraph follows immediately after the above 
quoted direct allegation that Lack, as the package agency 
operator, "received and took possession" of all the liquor 
including this, and that he did so "pursuant to * * * 
said agreement, Exhibit A." That could not, of course, be 
as a drug store operator. 
And it cannot be claimed, that this or any allega-
tion referring to "defendants" is an allegation that 
charges the partnership as such . Such references can 
have no relation whatsoever to appellant's theory of 
partnership liability of respondent. The partnership is 
not a "defendant" at all. So this allegation actually 
says only that the liquor was delivered to Lack at the 
pharmacy location. 
Now, let's see if any more can be claimed for the use 
of "defendants" in par. 7 (R. 3), that "defendants sold 
and otherwise disposed of" the mentioned portion of all 
the liquor received by Lack~ We think not. 
First, to get its partnership theory of liability to at-
tach to this respondent, plaintiff must get the partner-
ship into the liquor handling "business." This appellant 
16 
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._ 
does not attempt to do, and this allegation ha.s no ten-
dency to do it, because "defendants" cannot 1nean the 
partnership. 
Secondly, the ~ale and delivery is neither by this 
allegation, nor by the cmnplaint nor by plaintiff's brief, 
claimed to be the conversion relied upon here. Nor can it 
be so claimed. 
Let it be noted, in this connection, that one of the 
individual defendants so charged in this complaint with 
''selling and disposing of" liquor, is :Mr. Lack. He is ap-
pellant's vendor; and appellant has already, in this com-
plaint, alleged a contract, (Ex. A) by the specific terms 
of which he is required to sell, and thus also dispose of, 
all this liquor. 
It was his duty to sell it. That was the purpose for 
which appellant delivered it to him, and it was what 
appellant was paying him for doing. (R. 8) 
Keeping in mind, then, the lack of any allegation 
that the partnership ever possessed or engaged in selling 
any liquor, and also the fact that the allegations refe,r-
ring to Lack's conduct show that he was acting "pur-
suant" to the package agency agreement, not as a phar-
macy partner, nothing can be claimed as against respond-
ent, by merely including him individually by the use of 
the plural "defendants," in connection with sales. 
Since no wrong-doing is remotely indicated by the 
allegation of sales, as applied to Lack, and he is alleged 
to have engaged in the sales, how could a conversion 
17 
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arise as against respondent, by reason of the fact that he 
might have joined or helped Lack in this rightful act, or 
acts~ It seems that the most that could be taken as an 
inference or presumption of fact would be that respond-
ent helped Lack to do something which Lack had a right 
and duty to do. 
It is not alleged, or claimed, that the sales consti-
tuted a conversion, anyway. And a most conclusive eli-
mination of any claim of conversion by this plural use 
of "defendants," as to "delivery" or sale, is that appel-
lant does not, either by this or any other allegation, 
or by the points raised in its brief on this appeal, claim 
a conversion by reason of possession or sales, wrongful 
or otherwise. 
In fact, the very next allegation departs from any 
intention to claim a conversion of the liquor itself, or a 
conversion by reason of the sale of it. 
There the complaint (R. 3). states the value of part 
of liquor so alleged to have been sold, and then says: 
"for all of which the said defendant failed, ne-
glected and refused to account to plaintiff and 
that, THEREFORE, the said defendants wrong-
fully converted the value thereof, to wit: the sum 
of $37,805.17 to their own use,* * *" (emphasis 
ours.) 
So, while the retail value is probably not the value 
which could rightly be claimed for conversion of the 
liquor by the respondent, under the general rule, the 
amount Lack was required to remit upon sale by him 
under his contract was the "retail value." (R. 8) And, 
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taking the ordinary Ineaning of this allegation and any 
definition or use of the word "therefore," this clearly 
says. that, by reason of defendants' failure to account, 
said defendants "conYerted the value of" so much liquor 
to their own m:'e. It then adds, and this is plainly cor-
rect, that it is this failurH to account for the "smn" due 
the Commission that caused its alleged drunage. 
This is the only tin1e "converted" is used in the com-
plaint and this is the only thing alleged as a "conver-
sion," therein. 
Thus, from the facts alleged in this complaint, it is 
plain that Lack is sufficiently charged with a claim, 
at least for breach of his contract. This complaint say~ 
he has failed to do exactly what it recited in the con-
tract pleaded, that he would do, in this respect, to pro-
tect appellant against this loss. 
And for this, he gave the statutory bond. And so, 
as appellant alleges (R. 8), it collected on this bond. 
And so, too, all plainly understood that it all had to do 
with the package agency businHss, not the drug store 
business. But, this is not an allegation of conversion by 
anyone, as we shall further show. 
And respondent, by the complaint, had no duty "to 
account" for all or any of the liquor received by Lack 
from appellant "pursuant to this agreement." Failure 
to account is not conversion, and there is no allegation 
that respondent ever had possession of any "sum" or 
11 ~ amount of n1oney received from the liquor. And appel-
.u: lant does not claim liability on such basis. 
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It does allege that, at the time of the failure to 
account, Lack was appellant's partner in the drugstore 
business. B~t yet, it is nowhere alleged, or intimated, 
that this partnership, or this drug store, ever had pos-
session or control of any of the liquor, or of any "sum" 
of money from it, or ever "failed to account," or ever 
"converted" anything. 
The brief, in fact, seems to eliminate any possibility 
of any claim or inference that the loss resulted from any 
operation of the drug store, by the affirmative statement 
that the loss was from the operation of the package 
agency. It says (p. 4): 
"This action was brought to recover the sum 
of $37,805.17 which was lost to the State of Utah 
'THROUGH THE OPERATION OF the Brigham 
Street Pharmacy L I Q U 0 R PACKAGE 
AGENCY, in the years 1946 to 1948." 
This mixing of the pharmacy name with that of the 
liquor package agency designation seems to be another 
attempt, by mere insinuation, to involve the partnership. 
The contract plainly states how this agency shall be 
designated. It says that it "shall be designated as Pack-
age Agency No. 78." 
Before leaving this, we point out, also, that the above 
quotation from their brief, as to this action, and as to 
loss, does not claim the loss of any liquor, but alleges 
sale of liquor and failure to account, and loss of a "sum" 
of money, and recites that this action was brought to 
recover such a "smn." 
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On the same page of the brief (p. -1-), near the end 
thereof, it again states the "yalne," as above quoted here-
in, and then says. "that this sum had been converted by 
defendants.·· So that it is clear that there is no claim of 
conYersion of liquor by the sale of it, or, in fact, at all. 
So it is clear that the loss claimed was "through the 
operation of" the "package agency," and by reason of a 
"failure to account." 
What Appellant Claims It has Alleged: 
Before the argument, we will quote what the appel-
lant, in its brief, claims it had alleged as a basis of clall:n 
here. 
Strikingly, although perhaps naturally, appellant 
makes no mention of the first set of allegations above 
referred to and analyzed by us. These are the elaborate 
allegations constituting about four-fifths of its com-
plaint, which amply show that it was "in the ordinary 
course of the business" of the liquor package agency that 
the loss really occurred. 
Appellant, in its brief, (p. 9), says the "complaint 
alleges": 
1. "The existence of a parnership known as Brig-
ham Street Pharmacy." 
2. Sets "forth * * * the delivery to the defend-
ants at the Brigham Street Pharmacy of 
liquor, the property of plaintiff." (This is the 
whole $1,057,000.00 worth.) 
3. "Furthermore, it has alleged the conversion 
by the defendants of a portion thereof of the 
value of $37,805.17." 
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We have quoted and have tried fully to analyze 
what actually has been alleged as to these matters, and 
wherein the allegations are lacking. We will deal with 
some law on the last of these claims, under Point I-A im-
mediately, and with the law on the others more generally 
under Point I-B later. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1-A 
The complaint does not allege a claim because (a) "The 
recital of a conversion, in the complaint (R. 3), is a con-
clusion of law, and is not supported, but is nullified, by the 
specific facts alleged." 
The foregoing analysis and the authorities cited 
later under Point I-B will dispose, we believe, of every 
possible. claim of liability against this respondent, except 
such as may possibly be claimed by the general allega-
tions of conversion under paragraph 3, as just above 
quoted. 
There is only the one mention of "converted" or 
"conversion." This is in paragraph 7 of the complaint, 
and seems to be the only thing to which this claim, 
just quoted as No. "3," above, could refer. 
It is our position that the foregoing deduction that 
"defendants failed * * * to account to this plaintiff, and 
that, therefore, the said defendants wrongfully converted 
the value thereof," is a conclusion of law, which is not 
admitted by our motion, and it is not supported, but is 
nullified, by the detailed allegations of fact from which 
it is deduced. 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The following authorities show that the rule is the 
smne under the forn1er Code practice and the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and is to the effect that, where such 
a conclusion is alleged a.s a deduction from facts alleged, 
and the facts pleaded do not sustain the conclusion, 
the facts pleaded are controlling, and the conclusion will 
be disregarded. 
1 Bancroft Code Pleading, Practice and Remedies 
( 1937 Ed.), p. 60, states the rule as follows: 
"\vnere a pleading contains both general and 
specific averments which are inconsistent, or 
where there is alleged a conclusion and also 
the facts frmn which it is drawn, and such facts 
are inconsistent with and do not sustain the con-
clusion, the specific averments or special facts 
are controlling, and the general allegations will 
be disregarded as immaterial." 
See, also, I d., p. 28, as follows: 
"The Inere presence of a conclusion, if a lo-
gical deduction from facts alleged, will not render 
a pleading insufficient. But a conclusion has no 
greater force than the premise upon which it is 
founded, and it is inadequate when it is unsup-
ported by the recited facts upon which it de-
pends." 
This rule of pleading has been repeatedly recognized 
in the Federal Courts under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which are the same as ours, on this. 
For example, in DeLoach v. Crowleys, 128 F. (2) 
378, (1942), it is said, at p. 380: 
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"Under this rule a petition may be dismissed 
on motion if clearly without any merit, and this 
want of merit may consist in an absence of law 
to support a claim of the sort made, or of facts 
sufficient to make a good claim, or in the dis-
closure of some facts which will necessarily defeat 
the claim." 
Burns v. Spiller, 4 F.R.D. 299, aff'd. 161 F. (2) 377, 
(App. D.C. 1947), certiorari denied 332 U.S. 792 (1947). 
This case also illustrates the application of this rule 
of pleading. Here, although the complaint contain'ed con-
clusions to the effect that the conduct of the defendants 
was wrongful, unlawful, and malicious, the complaint 
was dismissed because the facts set forth in support of 
this conclusion failed to show that such conduct was, in 
fact, tortious. 
This rule of pleading is analogous to the principle 
which has been consistently applied in the. Federal 
Courts, that where a complaint alleges a conclusion 
which, by itself, may state a cause of action, if other 
facts are set forth which disclose a defense to the claim 
asserted, the complaint cannot be sustained as against 
a motion to dismiss. See, for example, Abram v. San 
Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 46 F. Supp. 969, 974 (1942), 
(Statute of Limitations); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Glen-
shaw Glass Co., 47 F. Supp. 711, 714 (1942), (Statute of 
Limitations and Laches); Hoover v. Lacey, 80 F. Supp. 
691, 693 (1948), (Release of a Contract Claim). 
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.-
This case inYolYed a suit under the Fair Labor 
Standards .. :\.ct. In order for that Act to be applicable, 
the e1nployee plaintiff n1ust have been engaged in inter-
state conunerce. The complaint alleged, generally, that 
the employee was engaged in interstate commerce. ':J.1he 
complaint went on further, however, and more particu-
larly described the nature of plaintiff's duties. 
It was held that the complaint must be construed 
in the light of the particular facts alleged, which were 
controlling, and, since those facts disclosed that the em-
ployee was not engaged in interstate commerce, the com-
plaint was dismissed, despite the presence of a general 
allegation, in the form of a conclusion, to the contrary. 
The court said, at p. 665 : 
"While the complaint in this cause alleges in 
general terms that the plaintiff, and those for 
whom he sues, are engaged in interstate com-
merce, the allegations so alleging must be taken 
in connection with the other allegations of the 
complaint where plaintiff attempts to particular-
ize the duties of the employees involved in this 
controversy, and to state in what manner they are 
engaged in Interstate Commerce * * * ." 
Robbins v. Zabarsky, 44 F. Supp. 867 (1942). 
This case is a suit for liquidated damages under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USCA, Sec. 207). Under 
Sec. 213 (b) of that Act, Sec. 207 did not apply to em-
ployees subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Com-
me·rce C01nmission, and employees were subject to the 
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jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
if their duties involved the safety of operation of inter-
state motor carriers. 
While the complaint alleged, generally, that the Fed-
eral Court had jurisdiction of the case under Sec. 207, 
it also alleged, more particularly, the duties of plain-
tiff as a mechanic, involved in repairing and servicing 
the trucks and equipment. It was held that the general 
allegations of jurisdiction were nullified by the particu-
lar allegations of fact indicating that plaintiff was sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. The complaint was, therefore, dismissed. 
At p. 869, the court said: . 
"The plaintiff objects to dismissal of the 
complaint on the ground that the question 
whether he is within the exemption should not be 
decided on a motion to dismiss. I do not believe 
that this objection is well-grounded. 'Failure to 
state a claim,' Rule 12 (b), Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 28 USCA, following Sec. 723(c), may 
be due to setting up too many facts as well as too 
few." 
The court also said, at p. 870: 
"It, therefore, seems that if facts are alleged 
in the complaint which make it possible to deter-
mine whether the exemption applied, the legal 
question of applicability of the exemption may be 
determined on a motion to dismiss. Cases cited 
by the plaintiff (citations omitted) * * * are dis-
tinguishable on the ground that there the allega-
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tions of the con1plaint were insufficient to enable 
the court to detern1ine the question of law raised 
by the n1otion to dismiss." 
The court also said, at p. 870, in refutation of an-
other argtm1ent, also here n1ade h)~ appellant (p. 9): 
"I cannot agree with the plaintiff's further 
contention that his allegations are insufficient to 
justify the action here taken because the proof 
1night show he was not within the jurisdiction 
of the Interstate C01nmerce Commission. The 
plaintiff's description of his job is sufficiently 
minute to give an ordinary person a dear impres-
sion of the nature of his duties." 
Additional authorities on this point might be cited 
at length, but, as we find no exception to the rule as 
stated, this would seem to serve no purpose. 
We believe these dispose of any claim that direct 
liability, or conversion by any acts or conduct of this 
respondent, has been alleged. It seems that such is not 
claimed. 
Additional law, applicable to both Points I-A and 
I-B, will be cited infra, under Point I-B. 
POINT 1-B 
"The claim of conversion, based on the theory of the 
partnership relation of Lack with respondent in the phar-
macy, is unsupported, and is unsound in law." 
Except for the one or two references in plaintiff's 
brief, and which we have thought might possibly be, con-
strued as elaiming that it has alleged a direct conversion, 
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all that is alleged or claimed is that this respondent is 
liable, by reason of this partnership relationship. 
Of course, the statement in the brief (p. 9) that "it 
has alleged conversion," may well be intended, also, to 
mean no more than that it has done this by alleging the 
partnership relation, as this relationship is recited im-
mediately before this statement. 
In fact, it is plainly said (p. 5) : "The theory of 
plaintiff is that where a conversion occurs in the course 
of operation of a partnership, each partner may be held 
liable * * * regardless of knowledge * * *." And, again 
(p. 6) : "Plaintiff's position is * * * if one partner con-
verted a portion thereof, then all partners may be held 
* * * ;" and (p. 6) : "This theory is fundamental to plain-
tiff's position so far as defendant Athas is concerned." 
This theory, alone, is argued in the brief. And, 
since it is the only one on which any law is cited, it is 
possible that we have been over-cautious in discussing 
the point of any claim of direct conversion, at all. 
In any event, the complaint is not based upon any 
claim of misconduct by this defendant Athas, or any 
claim of knowledge of any such. If such was intended, 
it would have been easy to allege conversion against 
him by the short form of complaint provided for by the 
Rules, which would have carried an implication of pos-
session by him and of knowledge on his part. But, ap-
pellant has elected to allege many facts, including these 
as to this partnership, and its business, and to rely upon 
a theory based thereon. 
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There was apparently a reason and purpose, and 
perhaps a conunendable one, in appellant's not claiming 
conYersion by any act of this respondent himself. And, 
also, in atten1pting this theory of vicarious liability, 
which is now repeated throughout the brief (pp. 5, 6, 14, 
15), and which rests upon C. V. Lack's conduct alone. 
One reason probably is that no personal contact 
by this defendant '"ith the liquor involved, and no knowl-
edge by him as to the handling or disposition of liquor 
by Lack could be proved, if it were alleged. 
Another reason, we think it may fairly be assumed 
for the State's hesitancy to allege that the loss of the 
liquor described in this complaint was due to any conduct 
of this respondent, is that such allegations would be en-
tirely contrary to the whole history of this particular 
liquor package agency, and the handling of this liquor 
as heretofore publicly aired for some months, and as 
established by the State in two recent cases. 
This factual history, and the conclusions as to re-
sponsibility for this loss, was there presented to this 
Court, on briefs presented by the Attorney-General and 
the Assistant, who have prepared this pleading and ap-
pellant's brief here, in this case, or who have participated 
in both. 
These cases are: State v. Lack, 221 P. (2) 852 (de-
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They dealt with this same liquor and alleged loss. 
Witnesses testified in great detail as to what transpired 
at the premises where. the appellant and Lack operated 
this package agency. Many people were rnentioned as 
participants, in different phases of the liquor handling, 
but the respondent Athas was apparently never present, 
or involved, or mentioned. 
Because this has other bearing here, we will pursue 
these cases a little further. It was stated (853) that 
Lack's shortage amounted in retail value to $37,805.00. 
This is the same dollar value as the loss alleged here. (R. 
3). 
(Incidentally, it is stated by this Court, as there es-
tablished, that $10,888.00 of this shortage and loss occur-
red before Lack's drug store partnership was formed. 
We merely wonder, in passing, how appellant would work 
its partnership agency theory as to this.) 
The opinion goes on to recite various criminal con-
duct and embezzlement, as charged against Lack, and 
also his intent to defraud. It recites the concealing of 
this shortage by "padding sales reports," also, the illegal 
selling to clubs, and that a "burglary was faked" by him 
to conceal his shortage. 
The opinion says of him: 
"Defendant was an agent of the State of 
Utah to sell the liquor in accordance with the 
liquor laws." 
As to the quantity of liquor lost, it is again stated 
in the opinion ( 613) : 
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• 
··To show the scope of the operation, we 
ha':e roughly computed the sales n1ade to only 
three of the clubs involved." These "three clubs 
paid Lack at least $35,000.00 for whiskey." 
As to responsibility for the alleged loss, we cannot 
refrain fron1 quoting fron1 the opinion again ( 613) : 
"That he (Lack) could operate and carry 
on such a large volmne of business from a package 
agency in such a notorious manner suggests either 
participation by someone in the Enforcement 
Division or unequaled laxity in upholding the 
law." 
So, as we have said, it is doubteful that appellant, 
or its counsel here, would want to, or did, attempt to 
allege or prove a factual story contrary to what they 
established in these cases. But, appellant seems to feel 
justified in attempting to attach a liability to this re-
spondent, if this can be done, on a technical theory of 
partnership agency alone; or feels justified, at least, 
in putting that question up to the Court. 
So, it argues, that because the·re was a partnership 
1n the pharmacy, Lack's misconduct can be attributed 
to this respondent, at least to the extent necessary to 
establish liability to appellant for the loss of the pro-
ceeds from a portion of the liquor delivered to Lack, as 
its agent, at the same general premises. 
So, too, the allegations of the complaint here aptly 
show again that Lack was, in fact, "an agent of the 
State of Utah to sell this liquor in accordance with the 
liquor laws." And, we think, the entire factual basis of 
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appellant's claim, and its full claim, is, as we stated, 
after careful analysis in the Lower Court, just this: 
"Plaintiff claims by this complaint that, if 
the Liquor Commission agrees with a person 
to operate. a package agency as its vendor, and if 
such vendor happens to be a 1ne1nber of a partner-
ship which, at the same time, is operating a retail 
drug store, and if such package agency is oper-
ated in a designated portion of the same prem-
ises in which said partnership retail business is 
operated, then the partner in the retail busi-
ness, because of his partnership relation therein, 
is responsible for the default of the package 
agency vendor, in failing to remit receipts from 
sales made in his conduct of the package agency." 
We may now add that this is the claim now pre-
sented, and relied upon, by appellant in this Court. 
After the complete allegations showing the arrange-
ments for, and the conditions of, delivery and handling 
of this liquor business, and also the allegations showing 
a different partnership line of business entirely, and 
after noting the absence of any allegations or inference 
or intimation that the partnership ever was intended to, 
or that it ever did, engage in the business of handling 
liquor in any way, it seems unnecessary to cite. authority 
on this Point I-B. 
It is true, of course, that if the liquor had been, 
in fact, handled in the "usual course of business" of the 
partnership, and if it had then failed to account for 
part of it, both partners would be liable; but the com-
plaint actually negatives any inference or intimation 
that it was. 
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It is fully alleged that the liquor business is the 
busines:s of Lack and the appellant. It could not legally 
be otherwise. And the business of the partnership is 
also alleged (R. ~), and liquor handling is not legally, or 
at all, "appropriate to'' or within the scope of the "ordi-
nary course or usages" of that business. Any pleaded 
or inferable acts of Lack, pertaining to liquor, would 
plainly be appropriate to and within the ordinary course 
of that business, and would not be within the agency of 
these partners. 
See: Salt Lake Brewing Co. v. Hawke, 24 U. 199, 
207; 66 p. 1058. 
It is impossible to see how handling or selling of 
liquor could be "in the ordinary course of the business" 
of a drug store, when any such business conducted there-
in would be a crime. It certainly could not be presumed 
to be in such ordinary course of business. 
And this partnership could not have been in, or have 
been dealt with in this liquor business, except in viola-
tion of the statute ( 46-0-82) which authorizes operation 
of a package agency by a "natural person" only. 
If the liquor frorn 1945 through 1948 had been 
handled in the "ordinary course of the drug store busi-
ness," of course, the Liquor Commission would, of neces-
sity, have known of it, and this loss is strung out over 
this whole period. The liquor delivered by, and not ac-
counted for to, the Commission is only 3¥2% of that 
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furnished to Lack at this agency. The other 96Y2% was 
paid for after Lack "received and took possession" (R. 3) 
of it. 
The law and the contract, under which this liquor 
business was operated, required that all the liquor 
handled be furnished and delivered by the Commission 
to Lack. And appellant alleges (R. 3) that it "per-
formed all of the conditions and obligations on its part 
to be performed." 
The Commission collected over a million dollars 
for this liquor, so delivered to and sold by him. It can-
not be assumed or inferred that the Commission entered 
into and engaged in all this business in violation of the 
law, and we do not believe that any such is intended to 
be alleged. This was never the "ordinary business" of a 
drug store. 
So it again comes down simply to what appellant 
has argued in its brief, which is this: If a person, who 
is an agent engaged in one line of business, is also 
a partner in one or several other and distinctly different 
lines of business, then everyone of his partners in every 
other line is liable for any tort he commits in the "ordi-
nary course" of the first business. 
Or, stated another way, where a person is a partner 
in one or more lines of business, and also operates one 
or more businesses of his own, any partner of his is 
liable for any tort that he may comrnit in the course of 
his own business or businesses. 
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...-: 
'V e agree that a partner in a business, in the course 
and furtherance of which a tort is committed by his 
partner, 1uay be charged therewith, \vithout an allega-
tion that he had knowledge of his partner's tortious 
conduct. 
But we confidently deny that he would be so liable, 
unless he at least had knowledge that he was a member 
in an existing partnership which was engaged in the 
course of a business in which it is alleged the claim of 
loss occurred. 
This is the obvious weakness of appellant's conten-
tion here. It alleges that this partnership was one en-
gaged in a legitimate business, which is universally and 
by statute recognized as a distinct and different business 
from the liquor business alleged, and in which this loss 
occurred, and then it has to argue that Lack's misconduct 
in the liquor business puts his drug store partnership 
into that liquor business, and makes it liable for his 
acts therein. 
No authority can be found for such a position or 
theory. 
Appellant first cites (p. 8) 69-1-10 of the Utah Code. 
This does not refer to conversion directly, but does state 
that: "Where by any wrongful act or omission of any 
partner, acting in the ordinary course of the business of 
the partnership * * * loss or injury is caused to any 
person * * * the partnership is liable therefor to the 
same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act." 
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Then, 69-1-11, which says that: uwhere the partner-
ship, in the course of its business, receives money or 
property of a third person, and the money or property 
so received is rnisapplied by any rnanner * * * the part-
nership is bound to make good the loss." 
The agency theory by which one partner binds 
another applies only while a partner is "acting in the 
ordinary course of the business of the partnership." 
And 69-1-11, referring to a situation where the "part-
nership receives" money or property in the course of 
its business, has no application here. 
There is no allegation or claim that this drug store 
partnership, either in "the course" of its business or in 
any manner, ever received any money or property of 
the plaintiff, or that anybody converted either of these. 
One question is what is meant by "acting in the 
ordinary course of the business of the partnership," 
and what is quoted as the test on this, in an Annotation 
in 175 A.L.R., p. 1311, is the following from Am. Jur.: 
40 Am. Jur., p. 261: 
"Sec. 190. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR TORTS. 
* * * The test of the liability is based on a deter-
mination of the question whether the wrong was 
committed in behalf of and within the reasonable 
scope of the business of the partnership." 
The liability of a non-acting partner rests upon the 
principle of agency. See: 
47 C.J., p. 826. 
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Jfechem on Aqency, Vol. 2, Sec. 1879. 
In this section, this author points out, also, that "the 
scope of the business," as applied in partnership ca.ses, 
is a .. corresponding term" to that of "within the course 
of his en1ployu1ent," as applied to an agent. 
Jfechem, Yol. 2, Sec. 1960. 
This section further points out that a principal may 
be liable for even wanton or malicious acts of his servant, 
if the servant were actually acting within the course of 
his en1ployn.1ent, and in the execution of his authority, 
and says: 
"But, in general terms, it may be said that 
an act is within the course of the employment if 
(1) it be something fairly and naturally incident 
to the business, and if ( 2) it be done while the 
servant was engaged upon the master's business 
and be done, although mistakenly or ill-advisedly, 
with a view to further the master's interests, or 
from some impulse or emotion which naturally 
grew out of or was incident to the attempt to 
perform the master's business, and did not arise 
wholly from, some external, independent and per-
sonal motive on the part of the servant to do 
the act upon his own account." 
47 C.J., p. 837, Sec. 300. 
This section also points out that an act by an indi-
vidual, even though he be a member of a partnership, 
if done "in his individual capacity and on his individual 
credit as principal, it is binding on him only, even though 
it accrues to the benefit of the firm." 
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See, also, Lowenstein v. Whitelaw, et al. (Wash.), 
34 P. (2) 1108, which case is cited in support of the above 
quotation. There is no benefit to the firm claimed here. 
40 Am. Jur., p. 261, et seq. 
This work discusses the matter of a partner's lia-
bility, commencing with debts, and continuing through 
torts, negligence, conversion, misappropriation, libel, 
slander, malicious prosecution, and up to criminal con-
duct. The last of these will be discussed briefly later. 
It is unnecessary to go into a discussion of all of 
these. In each paragraph, and in all the works on agency 
and partnership, it is emphasized that wrongful conduct, 
to bind an innocent partner, must be in, and in further-
ance of, a partnership business in which they are both 
engaged. The facts alleged here do not come even close 
to creating a partnership liability, or to bringing this 
respondent within any rule of agency liability. 
The complaint, in fact, affirmatively shows: 
1. That this respondent was not even a member 
of any existing partnership engaged in the 
liquor business, in the operation of which this 
loss occurred, at all. 
2. The loss occurred in the conduct of a business 
with which neither this respondent nor the 
partnership of which he is a member had any 
connection, at all. It is fully shown to be the 
separate line of business of Lack and appel-
lant. 
3. Any wrongful acts by which the loss could 
have been, or was, caused were not "commit-
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ted in behalf of and within the reasonable 
8cope of the business of the partnership," but 
\vere utterly foreign thereto. 
It requires no further eitation of authority to estab-
lish that the 1nere partnership with a person does not 
make one liable for any acts such person may commit. 
The following cases go much farther than we are re-
quired to go here, in disposing of this contention and, 
also, in disposing of any clailn of partnership liability 
here. 
Rouse v. Pollard, et al., 130 N.J. Eq. 304, 21 A. (2) 
801, 136 A.L.R. 1105. 
A member of a law partnership, acting for the firm, 
was, at the same time, acting on his own account. He 
was a member of the partnership firm sued. The firm, 
acting by him, had handled a divorce matter for the 
plaintiff. In the divorce settlement, the firm obtained 
for her some $28,000.00. She turned this money over to 
the acting partner. 
By agreement with her, he took $350.00 of this as the 
firm's fee, which it received. Then, pu;rsuant to her 
instruction, he kept the balance of the funds to invest 
for her, and, after paying her interest thereon for ten 
years, and having returned $7,000.00 of the fund to her, 
he absconded with the balance. 
He had also represented to her that the firm was, 
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The Court held that such was not a "characteristic 
function of the practice of law" and, therefore, not 
within the scope of authority or agency of one of the 
partners. And that the partner, therefore, in making 
such representation and receiving the funds involved, 
was not acting within his authority, and that he did not 
bind the partnership, nor was it liable. The opinion, and 
the Annotation following it, cite additional cases. 
Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. Shanblum, 294 F. 894 
(5 CC). 
This case is cited by 47 C.J., p. 884, in support of 
the statement that "the fact of partnership alone does 
not rend~r one member liable for the torts of another." 
In the case, there was a partnership for the buying, 
selling, threading, and handling of second-hand pipe 
and oil well supplies. The plaintiff brought the action 
against the partnership, to recover for pipe stolen from 
him, and which was purchased and disposed of by two 
of the partners. The other two defendant partners did 
not participate. as to this, and did not ratify or approve 
the handling of the stolen pipe, and the Court held that 
they were not liable to plaintiff. 
Even though the Court said the partnership was 
actually formed for handling the kind of product and 
engaged in the same line of business that these two part-
ners, so acting, were engaged in, the Court held that the 
partnership to buy and sell did not include within its 
scope the dealing in property known, by the partners 
acquiring the same, to have been stolen. 
40 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Here, as we ha.Ye above said, neither the conduct 
of Lack. the business in which it occurred, or the product 
handled, had any relationship to the partnership busi-
ness. 
See, also, Iron c. Sauve, 179 P. (2) 327 (Wash. 
19-! 7). ~-\.. t p. 330, the Court says : 
"It is not enough for appellants to establish 
an agency relationship; it must be established 
that Haltern1an (the partner) was doing some-
thing in f'urtherance of the purpose for which 
the relationship was created. In other words, it 
n1ust be within the scope of the partnership." 
The cases cited by appellant give no support to the 
contention actually made here that this respondent is 
liable by reason of his membership in a partnership 
with Lack, in a separate business. 
Each and all of these cases show that the conduct 
of the acting partner was within the usual business of 
the partnership and in furtherance thereof. For exam-
ple, the Brokaw case cited and quoted from (P. 8) was 
simply one where a brokerage firm engaged in the handl-
ing of securities received the securities of a client and 
one of the partners converted them. 
The Clark case cited from Colorado (P. 9), was one 
that rested upon innkeepers' liability. The innkeeper 
was a partnership and the law of Colorado made the 
partners liable for money of a guest deposited with them. 
The partner responsible for the loss of the money, the 
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The Appellants, at p. 9 of their brief refer the Court 
to an annotation in 67 Am. St. Rep. 38, and particularly 
to p. 42 and 43 thereof. At p. 39 and 40, however, the 
principles applicable to the instant case are set forth, 
wherein the author says: 
"A tort committed by one partner will not bind the 
partnership or the other co ... partners unless it be auth-
orized or adopted by the firm or be within the proper 
scope and business of the partnership: (citations omit-
ted). Hence, if the partner commits a tort, not as a 
partner, but as an individual in respect to a matter 
entirely foreign to the business of the partnership, the 
other partners are not answerable for his wrong: ( cita-
tions omitted)." 
Again at page 41, the author says : "If one member 
of a firm purchases cotton, which is liable for rent, and 
such purchase is not made for the firm, but for himself 
alone, and the cotton is converted to his own use, the 
other partner is not answerable where he had nothing to 
do with its conversion and received none of its proceeds: 
Stokes v. Burney, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 219." See also p. 4.f, 
where, after referring to the cases cited by appellant 
at p. 42 and 43, the Court says: "On the other hand, if 
money or property comes into the hands of a partner in 
the course of some transaction unconnected with the 
firm b1:1siness, his appropriation or mis-application there-
of will not affect his innocent co-partners, where the 
firm does not receive the benefit of the wrong: (Citations 
omitted). Thus, if a promissory note is delivered to one 
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member of a firm, as collecting agent, his refusal to 
re-deliver the note does not make his co-partners answer-
able for the amount thereof. Linn v. Ross, 16 N.J.L. 
55." 
In Nisbet r. Patton, cited at p. 9 of appellant'8 
brief, the Court 1nerely approved an instruction given 
in the lower court. That instruction clearly told the 
jury that •·the defendants having, as partners in busi-
ness, received the notes for a particular purpose, they 
were bound, when that purpose was accomplished, to 
surrender the notes." 
It does not appear that in that case the conversion 
occurred in the course of an unrelated business activity 
of one of the partners, and consequently that case does 
not support the appellant's position. 
It is Not Alleged that the Acting Partner was Acting 
for the Partnership : 
Appellant, in its brief (p. 9), makes the following 
statement as to this partnership claim: 
"Plaintiff, in its complaint, has alleged the 
existence of a partnership known as the Brigham 
Street Pharn1acy * * * Whether the disposition 
of this liquor occurred 'in the ordinary course 
of the business of the partnership,' we submit, 
is a matter of proof, * * *" 
So, first, we have an admission that this complaint 
does not allege "any wrongful act * * * of any partner 
acting in the ordinary course of the business of the 
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partnership." As it clearly does not. Yet the only prin-
ciple of law ( 69-1-10) cited or relied upon is in this quo-
tation. 
And, now, since the only allegation as to the partner-
ship is tha.t one existed for another kind of business, and 
since it is frankly stated in the brief (p. 4) that the loss 
occurred "through the operation of the * * * Liquor 
Package Agency," it affirmatively appears that liability 
is claimed purely by reason of the existence of this part-
nership. In fact, in stating its "theory" and its "posi-
tion" throughout its complaint (see PP. 5, 7, 13), appel-
lant uses this language: "Where a conversion occurs in 
the course of operation of a partnership, each partner 
may be held." 
This is not a statement of the law quoted and relied 
upon, or a statement of sound law, at all. It is language 
of confusion, which purposely avoids the related element, 
"while acting in the ordinary course of the business of 
the partnership." And, in view of the other allegations 
and admissions, it can mean, and must be intended to 
mean, only that, if a partnership exists and is "in course 
of operation" at the time one partner therein causes a 
loss, the innocent partner is liable. This, of course, is 
not so. 
And, also, "the disposition of this liquor" by Lack in 
this package agency business was not a wrongful act, 
under the law relied upon, either. Appellant had bound 
him by an agreement to sell the liquor. 
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~-\.nd, furthennore, we have shown that such opera-
tion, in the handling of the liquor, could not be "in the 
ordinary course of the business'' of the partnership oper-
ating "the Brighrun Street Phannacy." 
And appellant, haYing pleaded the facts frmn which 
it asks that its theory be deduced, is within the rule of 
decision in the Federal Court of Robbins v. Zabarsky, 
supra, wherein a motion to dismiss was granted, and the 
opinion said : 
"l cannot agree with the plaintiff's further 
contention that his allegations are insufficient to 
justify the action here taken because the proof 
might show he was not within the jurisdiction of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission. The plain-
tiff's description of his job is sufficiently minute 
to give an ordinary person a clear impression of 
the nature of his duties." 
We simply add that the detailed description of the 
liquor business here, and the allegation as to the business 
of the partnership, are certainly sufficient to give an 
ordinary person a clear picture of the nature of each 
of these separate businesses. There certainly cannot be 
any claim merely by reason of the physical proximity of 
these two different kinds of businesses. 
And, finally, when a plaintiff alleges detailed facts, 
from which a theory of liability is claimed or asked to 
be deduced, whether the theory of liability is sound or 
unsound, the matter of proof must depend upon its rele-
vancy to what has been pleaded. The rule, of course, 
requires that the facts must state a basis of claim. But 
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there is certainly no rule that plaintiff can prove the 
basic facts in support of its claim because it has not 
alleged such. 
Further Reasons Why No Liability Is Alleged: 
There are two matters of law to which reference 
has been made before, in addition to those cited under 
the foregoing points, and by reason of which this com-
plaint fails to state a claim as against this defendant. 
The sections of Ant. Jur., above referred to, as to 
different acts by a partner binding an innocent partner 
in tort, turn very frequently (as above pointed out by 
Mechem, also) on whether the acting partner is really 
engaged in furthering the business of the partnership, 
or whether he has stepped outside, because of some 
malice, or intent or purpose or "personal motive * * * 
to act upon his own account." 
We need not go into the detail of this, but call atten-
tion to the general rule that, where a partner engages 
in the conunission of a crime, except in those cases 
where the crime consists in the failure of the business 
to acquire the necessary licenses, or do other things of 
that character, the innocent partner is not generally 
liable for the criminal acts of his partner. This is on 
the theory, and we think that situation clearly prevails 
in this case, that, in committing a crime, a partner or 
agent steps into the field of his individual endeavor. 
40 Am. Jur., p. 266: 
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''See. 196. CRIMINAL AND PENAL LIA-
BILITIES.-..:\ partnership relation in a lawful 
enterprise will not render one partner liable for 
the intentional cri1ninal act of another. The lia-
bility of the absent partner is based on the theory 
of agency, but an agent's wanton criminal act 
will not bind his principal." 
Another 1natter to which attention has been previ-
ously directed, is the further reason why no conversion 
at all is alleged in that there can be no such thing a.s 
the conversion "of a value." 
We have pointed out that In the only mention of 
"converted" or "conversion" in the complaint, it is re-
cited: "That said defendants wrongfully converted the 
value thereof, to-wit: * * *". 
A value is "that which is considered an equivalent 
in worth." It is not, by any definition, tangible property 
or personal property. It is not, therefore, capable of 
conversion. 
Money itself, and particularly if identified, may be 
the subject of conversion. But there is no allegation that 
any sum of money was ever received by the partnership 
here, or by this respondent. Value would be somewhat 
similar to a chose in action. 
53 Am. Jur., p. 809: 
"Sec. 5. CHOSES IN ACTION.-An action 
will not lie for the conversion of a mere debt or 
chose in action." 
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"Sec. 4. INTANGIBLE PROPERTY.-It 
has been declared that an action for conversion 
lies for every species of personal property which 
is the subject of private ownership; that the con-
ception that an action for conversion lies only for 
tangible property capable of being identified and 
taken into actual possession is based on a fiction 
on which the action of trover was founded, name-
ly, that the defendant had found the property of 
another, which was lost; and that such conception 
has become, in the progress of law, an unmeaning 
thing which has been discarded by most courts. 
It is ordinarily held, however, that an action for 
conversion lies only for personal property which 
is tangible, or at least represented by or connect-
ed with something tangible, and not for such in-
definite, intangible, and incorporeal species of 
property as the good will of a business or a laun-
dry route, or a permit to conduct business, or a 
licensed market stall for transacting trade." 
POINT II. 
The Trial Court did not err in granting l'lespondent's 
motion for a more definite statement, based on the ground 
that the complaint "is so vague and ambiguous" that re-
spondent "could not reasonably be required to frame a 
responsive pleading," nor in dismissing .plaintiff's com-
plaint for r,efusal to furnish a more definite statement, when 
so ordered by the Court. 
While the claim upon which appellant apparently 
relies here, has become more certain by reason of con-
cessions and statements of theory in its brief, the situa-
tion on this point must be considered as it was presented 
to the Trial Court on the motion and complaint. 
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We were there 1net with the problem of determining, 
as to both causes of action, what theories of liability 
might be asserted as against this respondent, and of 
attempting to determine which of such theories n1ight 
be legally sound. 
We believe, the situation presented is this: 
If appellant's basis of claim of liability is, as we 
have stated and briefed it under Point I-B, then it does 
not come within the principle of law solely relied upon, 
and the Trial Court was right in sustaining our first 
motion. A claim was not stated and if a claim was not 
stated, as claimed under Point I, then this Point II need 
not be further considered. 
But, on the other hand, if appellant claims that its 
theory of liability is not confined to the one point of 
claim, or is not confined to the possible theories or claims 
which we have attempted to discover and to refute under 
Point I, then it should be conceded that its refusal to 
furnish a more definite statement justified the decision 
under this Point II. Rule 12 (e) requires that its com-
plaint must be disposed of, if it so refuses. 
Furthermore, there is no sense or reason or law, 
and no law has been cited, for appellant's off-handed 
brushing aside of both Rule 12 (b), as to stating a claim, 
and also Rule 12 (e), as to a more definite statement, 
with the mere assertion that something might be un-
covered or found out under other later Rules, appro-
priate and applicable only after the formation of the 
pleadings, and for other purposes. 
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Rule 12(b) is intended to save the time and expense 
of the courts and parties, by determining at the outse1 
whether plaintiff has a valid legal claim. 
Rule 12 (e) seeks to serve the same purposes, by 
enabling the parties to get at something definite enough, 
so that they won't be litigating in all directions. This 
rule has particular application, as shown by the auth-
orities herein cited, to pleadings of this character, where 
detailed facts are set forth and several possible claims 
suggested. 
It is also very plain that our motion did not seek 
"evidentiary" matters, as claimed by appellant. On this, 
while we do not repeat our motion, we do ask the Court 
to note (R. 16) that it seeks only for the theories or bases 
of liability against respondent, who, as appellant states 
(p. 11), was a "non-contracting partner." We were try-
ing to get at something we could plead to, without hav-
ing to speculate as. to all that might be claimed under 
the two causes of action then alleged. The motion point-
ed out "details" desired as the Rule required . 
.And, it seems to us that, if Rule 12 (e) is ever to 
have the application intended, this was the place for it. 
We agree that if the complaint sets forth "a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief" (URCP 8(a), each averment of 
which is "simple, concise, and direct" 8 (e) ( 1) ) , a motion 
for a more definite statement, attempting merely to 
compel the plaintiff to set out the evidentiary detail8 
upon which that claim is based, may be denied. 
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"\Ye also agree with Professor :Moore (2 Moore's 
Federal Practice, p. 1651, 2d Ed. 194 7) that "the true 
test i~ whether the pleading gives fair notice and states 
the elements of the clai1n plainly and succinctly, and not 
·whether as an abstract 1natter it states 'conclusions' or 
'facts'." 
In the instant case, however, it is clear that the com-
plaint does not comply with the requirements of clarity, 
brevity, and conciseness set forth in URCP 8 and, there-
fore, a situation is presented which calls for the appli-
cation of URCP 12(e) to compel compliance with URCP 
8. 
Appellant begs the whole question when it says, at p. 
14 of its brief, that a complaint complying with Rule 8, 
URCP, is not subject to motion for a more definite state-
ment. The issue is whether the complaint does comply 
with Rule 8, and the discussion following will be directed 
to pointing out that the complaint here considered does 
not in any sense comply with URCP 8. 
In the first place, this complaint does not set forth 
plainly and concisely, or at all, any legal theory of lia-
bility of the defendant Athas. A complaint must, in the 
first instance, in order to comply with UR,CP 8, set forth 
a legal theory of liability in simple and concise language. 
As eminent an authority as Professor Moore has thi:::; 
to say about the necessity of setting forth a theory of 
liability (2 Moore's Federal Practice, p. 1656, et seq., 
2d Ed. 1947) : 
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"The Federal Rules have done away with the 
narrow 'theory of the pleadings' doctrine. This 
doctrine, applied in many code states, requires a 
pleader to state a definite theory of his case, on 
which theory he must win or fail. Under the 
F'ederal Rules, on the. other hand, a party is not 
'required to pick and stick to one theory of law 
* * * only to find when he gets to trial that he 
has chosen the wrong one.' Amendments may be 
made during and after trial under Rule 15, chang-
ing the theory on which the case is brought, and 
under Rule 54 (c) the party is to be granted any 
relief to which he is entitled even though he has 
not demanded it* * *." 
"This does not mean, however, that a plead-
ing should not indicate some legal theory on which 
the pleader hopes to recover. As a practical 
matter, a good lawyer will of necessity have one 
or mo~re theories of law upon which he believes 
his client is entitled to recover; if he cannot work 
out any theory he is not likely to have much 
success with his suit. True, the courts will go 
very far in finding a basis on which to sustain 
a pleading as against a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a clairn, but good practice de-
mands that the pleader state his claim with sim-
plicity and clarity in the first instance, rather 
than set out a jurnble of unrelated facts and hope 
that the court will work out his case for him. 
Further, if the pleading is to give 'fair notice' 
of the claim it will normally have to be bottomed 
upon some theory supporting recovery. Indeed, 
it has been argued that this is now the major 
function of the pleadings, since the facts can be 
better gotten at by discovery. 
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"The courts haYe rerognized these considera-
tions in a line of cases supporting the proposition 
that the pleadings should indicate the theory 
or theories on which the pleader relies. Judge 
Leibell has stated it in this Inanner: 'Although 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plain-
tiff's relief does not depend upon the theory of 
action or actions whirh she adopts in her com-
plaint, * * * in the interest of clarity and good 
pleading, she should state the grounds upon which 
her various causes of action depend. Not only is 
such a statement necessary in order to present 
defendant 1cith a complaint to which he can 
readily prepare an answer, but also a proper 
definition of the issues will greatly facilitate 
futnre proceedings in the case, such as examina-
tions before trial.' In this case the complaint, 
in addition to violating other provisions of the 
Rules, stated elements of a number of different 
causes of action without any clear demarcation of 
the legal theories on which plaintiff predicated 
recovery. In another case the court was unable 
to determine whether a cause of action was in-
tended to be stated as an action for fraud, for 
breach of contract or for conversion, and there~ 
fore dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. 
Similar rulings have been made in other cases." 
"This requirement that the pleader indicate 
the legal theory of his claim does not, of course, 
require him to pick one particular theory and 
cling to it to the exclusion of all others. Under 
Rule 8(e) (2) he may state the claim alternatively 
or hypothetically in the same count or in separate 
counts, and he will not be required to make an 
election between inconsistent theories. And as 
indicated above he Inay, within fairly broad lim-
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its, shift his position before or at the trial under 
Rule 15, and even without amendment is entitled 
to any relief justified by the evidence." 
Another eminent authority, Judge Charles E. Clark, 
who played an important part in the forxnulation of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (See 2 Utah Law Review 
12, 19, note 19, 1950), has indicated in a unanimous 
opinion by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Herman 
v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 108 F. (2) 
678, 682, ( C.A. 3rd 1939) that a complaint, subject to 
"varied interpretations," such as the complaint in the 
instant case, may be rendered more certain pursuant 
to Rule 12 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In addition to the cases cited in the previous quota-
tions, see: 
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., Inc. et al., 
31 F. (2) 730 (D.C. M.D. Tenn. 1940): 
"Upon due consideration thereof, the Court is of 
the opinion that interrogatories as provided for under 
Rule 33 are not considered as a preliminary step in the 
formation of pleadings but may be utilized for the pur-
pose of obtaining evidentiary matters, after pleadings 
have been formulated; * * *" 
"The Court is therefore of the opinion that the 
proper method of obtaining . a more definite statement 
of facts not averred with sufficient definiteness or par-
ticularity, in the original complaint to enable defendant 
to properly prepare his responsive pleading, is by a 
motion for a more definite statement or for a bill of 
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particulars under Rule l:.?(e), and this view has appar-
ently been adopted by a large nmnber of courts through-
out the country." 
.Also, Hartman Elecf1·ical illfg. Co. v. Prime Mfg. 
Co., 8 F.R.D. 510 (D.C. E.D. \Yis. 1949) : "The defend-
ant, as well as the Court, .is entitled to know with reason-
able certainty the basis of the plaintiff's claim for relief." 
Also, Gulf Coast Tr estern Oil Co. v. Trapp, 165 F. 
(2d) 343, ( C.A. lOth 1947), where the Court says, at p. 
348: 
"If the requisite allegations of a complaint 
under Rule 8 (a) ( 2) are too general or indefinite 
to apprise the defendant of the nature of the 
charge leveled at hin1, or are insufficient to enable 
him to prepare his defense, he may require of 
plaintiff the additional information under Rule 
12(e) by a motion for a more definite statement 
of fact." 
In the second place, if it is attempted to assert a 
vicarious liability on the part of the defendant, as is 
presumably so in the instant case (p. 7 of appellant's 
brief), the defendant is entitled to know the basis of 
such liability. That is, the defendant is entitled to know, 
before he can "reasonably be" expected to file a respon-
sive pleading, to what extent he allegedly participated 
in or instigated the alleged acts resulting in liability, 
or, if he did not so instigate or participate in the acts 
alleged, whether, and to what extent, he ratified or 
adopted those acts, or is otherwise liable for the same. 
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A case in point, in addition to the cases previously 
cited under Point II, is Picking v. Pennsylvania Ry. 
Co., 5 F.R.D. 76 (D.C. Pa. 1946), wherein a railroad 
company was being sued for damages for allegedly par-
ticipating in a conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of rights 
guaranteed by USCA Const. Amend. 14, and subject 
such plaintiffs to false arrest and imprisonment. It was 
held that the defendant was entitled to a more specific 
statement as to the manner in which the company adopt-
ed or instigated the alleged unlawful acts, and as to the 
capacity or position of its agents taking such action. 
In the third place, it would seem that the defendant 
is entitled to know, if it is attempted to assert a con-
version on his part, plainly and precisely, what property 
was allegedly converted. A direct and concise allegation 
to that effect is essential, not only in order that the 
defendant may file a responsive pleading, but, also, in 
order to enable the defendant to i~telligently avail him-
self of the discovery procedures provided by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Having above set forth the law applicable to the 
issue raised by the motion for a more definite state-
ment, we next consider the application of that law to 
the facts of the instant case. 
The lack of any alleged theory of liability, we be-
lieve, is conclusively demonstrated by Para. 7 of the 
complaint (R. 3) wherein it is alleged that the defendants 
(meaning presumably defendant Lack and defendant 
Athas) "failed, neglected and refused to account to this 
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plaintiff, and that, therefore, the said defendants wrong-
fully converted the value" of what is contended to be a 
subject of conversion. Note that there is not only com-
pletely lacking any allegation of the origin of any duty 
to ''account to this plaintiff," but also in the previous 
para. 6 (R. 3) the complaint specifically negatives the 
existence of any such duty in that the liquor is alleged 
to have been "received" by the defendant (i.e. defendant 
Lack) ''pursuant to the terms and conditions of said 
agreement, Exhibit A." And with respect to the agree-
ment referred to, it is further alleged (Para. 4 R. 2) 
"that in all instances the term 'vendor' as used in said 
agreement referred to the defendant, C. V. Lack." 
In short, it is alleged that the liquor was received 
and possessed by defendant Lack pursuant to an agree-
ment solely between plaintiff and defendant Lack, and 
that, "therefore," the defendant Athas is liable in con-
version because he failed to account for liquor which he 
never received and for which he was never obligated 
to account under the terms of the agreement referred 
to. 
We certainly think that the complaint was, there-
fore, so "vague and ambiguous" with respect to the 
theory of this appellant that respondent could not reason-
ably be expected to intelligently respond to it by any 
pleading whatsoever, and, moreover, that the complaint 
did not give to this respondent "fair notice" of the 
basis of any legal claim for re<lief. So, also, this respond-
ent could not be compelled to resort to the discovery 
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proVIsiOns (U.R.C.P. 26 to 37) of the Rules since those 
provisions are appropriate only for ascertaining facts, 
not theories. 
Next, we consider the existence of any basis of 
vicarious liability in the allegations of this complaint. 
In paragraph 2 (R. 1) it is alleged that "the de-
fendants * * * were partners, doing business under the 
firm name and style 'Brigham Street Pharmacy'." In 
paragraph 5 (R. 2) it is further alleged that "said de-
fendants owned and operated said Brigham Street Phar-
macy as partners and shared in the profits and losses 
thereof." It has been pointed out that there is nowhere 
any allegation whatsoever that the defendants were en-
gaged as partners in a liquor package agency. Then it 
is alleged (Para. 6 R. 3) that from 1945 to 1948, a quan-
tity of liquor was "delivered to the defendants at the 
Brighan1 Street Pharmacy," but that only the "defend-
ant (defendant Lack) received and took possession of 
the same" pursuant to the agreement previously refer-
red to. 
We think the sum of these allegations, intelligibly 
construed, is to the effect that the defendants were part-
ners in the retail drug business and the liquor was de-
livered at those premises to be used in the liquor pack-
age agency pursuant to an agreement solely between 
defendant Lack and the plaintiff. 
We fail to see how these allegations can be taken 
as asserting any basis for a vicarious liability on the 
part of defendant Athas whether in the operation or 
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ordinary course of business of any partnership, whether 
under the theory of defendant Lack as the agent of de-
fendant ~\thas, or whether on any theory of ratification 
or adoption by defendant Athas of the acts of defendant 
Lack. Certainly, then, this respondent, is fairly entitled 
to enlightenn1ent in this respect. 
Next, we consider the allegations pertaining to the 
subject matter of the conversion. The allegation relat-
ing to this is set forth in Para. 7 (R. 3) to the effect 
that the "defendants wrongfully converted the value 
thereof, to wit: the su1n of $37,805.17." As heretofore 
pointed out in this brief, since it is impossible to con-
vert the "value" of· any thing, clarification is imperatively 
required with respect to this allegation. Moreover, apart 
from any theory of vicarious liability, there can be no 
conversion unless it is alleged that the defendant Athas 
was in the possession or control of something capable 
of being converted. Any allegation to that effect is 
wholly lacking in this complaint. 
In conclusion, then, on this point, it is futile for this 
appellant to attempt to place the burden on this re-
spondent of defining all the issues that could be involved 
in this case by any responsive pleading of his, in view 
of the "vague and ambiguous" character of this com-
plaint. Moreover, it is equally futile for this appellant 
(p. 1-l of appellant's brief) to attempt to relegate this 
respondent to the discovery procedures afforded by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when such procedures 
are rendered useless to this respondent because, by util-
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izing them, he can only be probing in the dark for thE 
basis of the claim for relief attempted to be asserted in 
this case. In short, recourse to either pleading or dis-
covery by this respondent will be futile at any time be-
fore the position of appellant in this case is considerably 
clarified. 
CONCLUSION 
This is not the ordinary case, dismissed on motion. 
Neither is it one where there need be concern as to 
whether injustice may result by appellant not having 
had its day in court. It wants, only, the disposition of an 
issue of law. 
Appellant itself chose to present a limited theory of 
liability, based on alleged agency only, and resting upon 
misconduct of its own agent, which conduct has become 
publicly well known. It pleaded facts which it does not 
desire to change, and from which it claims a technical 
liability may be deduced. It intentionally avoided rais-
ing any facts reflecting any theory of liability based on 
respondent's individual knowledge or conduct. 
It not only elected to present this limited theory, but 
it also voluntarily elected to stand upon its complaint, 
as to both motions of respondent, sustained by the Trial 
Court, and appellant refused to amend, thus definitely 
indicating, then and now, that it does not want to claim 
liability upon any other basis nor furnish a more definite 
statement, after being ordered to do so by the Court. 
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Furthennore, it appears that justice, instead of 
being prevented, is, in reality, served by the ruling of 
the Court, independently of any n1ore technical merit of 
the clain1 presented. 
The allegations as to the liquor business show that 
appellant's own neglect in discharging its statutory 
duties as to strict control and supervision of many de-
tails of the conduct of its package agency allowed its loss 
to occur. And, that its failure to require an adequate 
surety bond for its protection, in the event of the failure 
of its agent to account as he had agreed, also contributed 
to such loss. True, this is all hind-sight now, but it indi-
cates the injustice of this atten1pt to charge respondent 
for the loss. 
The complaint affirmatively also shows that this 
agency operation was not a losing one, but was highly 
profitable to appellant, in that $1,057,000.00 retail value 
of liquor was delivered here, and that all, except $37,-
000.00 worth, was paid for. So that Lack paid to appel-
lant $1,020,000.00 for liquor he sold. 
The failure to account for $37,000.00 retail value, of 
course, did not result in a loss of that amount, as ap-
proximately one-third of that would, under the statute 
and practice, have been profit. Of the approximately 
$25,000.00, therefore, lost, $4,000.00 was collected from 
the Surety Company, as alleged (R. 3), reducing such 
loss to a total of about $21,000.00, or less. 
We think it is common knowledge, also, that on $1,-
020,000.00 retail worth of liquor accounted for, appellant 
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made a profit of somewhere between $200,000.00 and 
$300,000.00. Or, in other words, that its profit on this 
venture was at least ten times the loss it is here com-
plaining about. 
In view of all the foregoing, it would appear to be 
a gross injustice to attempt to take all this profit, and 
then impose upon this respondent a total penalty and loss 
of this amount, or any portion of it, since the loss was 
plainly incident to the liquor business, which produced 
the profit. 
It is not anywhere intimated that he, or any business 
that he was connected with, received one dime out of 
this liquor business operation. The opposite is indicated 
by the statement of appellant that its theory is that re-
spondent is liable, even though there was no participa-
tion, or even any knowledge, on his part of any miscon-
duct on the part of Lack. 
On the merits, it would serve no purpose to repeat 
our contention here, that the theory of liability is not 
sustained and is not sound, and that the Trial Judge did 
not err in granting both motions of the respondent. There 
is no reasonable basis for contending that the Court 
could have done otherwise. 
We respectfully submit that the orders of the Trial 
Court here should be affirmed. 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
C. E . .Athas 
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